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Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of
Business Activities in Conflict Zones
Simon Chesterman*
Abstract
There is a prokferation of literature discussing human rights and business, but far less
that looks at the issue of businesses operating in conflict Zones and the applicability of
international humanitarian law. This is understandable in terms of the prominence and
dynamism of human rights as a sub-discipline, contrasted with the conservatism of international
humanitarian law. But from a doctrinal perspective it is somewhat odd, as the direct
applicabiIity of human rights norms to business is far less clear than the applicability of
international humanitarian law. Section II of this paper describes the normative regime that is
set up by human rights and international humanitarian law, before Section III turns to the
.pecific situation of conflict zones and efforts to regulate some of the newer entities on the scene,
in particular private military and security companies. Section IV then sketches out a regime
that focuses not on toothless regulation, but on a model of governance that combines limited
sanctions with a wider structuring of incentives. These three parts are referred to in shorthand as
"lawyers," 'guns," and "money."
* Global Professor and Director of the New York University School of Law Singapore Programme;
Vice Dean and Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore. E-mail:
chesterman@nyu.edu. This work was first presented at a seminar convened in Galway by the
Irish Centre for Human Rights and the Geneva Institute for International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights in April 2010. Many thanks to the participants, in particular Andrew Clapham and
William Schabas, for their thoughtful comments and suggestions on the text; errors and omissions
remain mine alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now twelve years since the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court was adopted in July 19981 Days after that landmark document was
concluded, the Financial Times published a dire warning for "commercial lawyers"
that the accomplice liability provisions in the treaty "could create international
criminal liability for employees, officers and directors of corporations.,, 2 Ti
might have been technically true, but the failure of the International Criminal
Court to include the liability of legal persons and the likely difficulties of
establishing individual guilt on the part of corporate officers suggested that the
breathless tone was a little over the top.
There had, in fact, been a push to include liability for corporations
themselves, led by the French delegation on the basis that this would make it
easier for victims of crimes to sue for restitution and compensation.' But
differences in the ways in which legal persons are treated in national jurisdictions
meant that consensus was impossible. Some also argued that it was
inappropriate for states to agree on the criminal responsibility of all entities
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), UN Doc No A/CONF 183/9,
reprinted in 37 ILM 99 (1998). See generally William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International
Criminal Court (Cambridge 2d ed 2004).
2 Maurice Nyberg, At Riskfrom Campd_ liilith Crime, Fin Times (July 28, 1998).
3 Per Saland, International Criminal Law Procedures, in Roy S.K. Lee, ed, The International Criminal Court:
The Making of the Rome Statute 189, 199 (Kluwer 1999).
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other than states themselves. The language was ultimately dropped from the
square brackets that were initially used to indicate its provisional inclusion in the
drafting process.
Six months later, at the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos, UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact. This compact is
"not a regulatory instrument-it does not 'police,' enforce, or measure the
behaviour of companies." Instead, it relies on "public accountability,
transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labor and civil
society to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon
which the Global Compact is based."5
We had, then, at the end of the twentieth century a remarkable pair of
normative transformations. On the one hand, a court was established with
potentially universal jurisdiction to prosecute the very worst crimes by
individuals. On the other hand, an implicit admission was made that efforts to
regulate the conduct of business through hard law had failed. "Regulation," if
that is even the right word, would have to be voluntary.'
Today, some things have changed. More businesses talk the talk of human
rights, but the legal framework applicable to them remains unclear. The language
of "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) begs the questions, responsible to
whom, and for what?' One interesting way to find out is to look at whom, within a
given business, holds the CSR file. Is it the legal division? Or is it marketing?
The language of CSR also begs the question of who is setting the priorities. Do
we focus on Nike's use of sweatshop labor because sweatshops are the greatest
human rights problem? Or is it because American university students like to
wear Nike sneakers?
4 See Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John
R.W.D. Jones, eds, 1 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 767, 779
(Oxford 2002) ("[It was felt 'morally obtuse for States to insist on the criminal responsibility of
all entities other than themselves[.]"'). See also Andrew Clapham, Extending International Criminal
Law Beyond the Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J Intl Crim Just 899, 915
(2008).
s See, for example, The United Nations Global Compact Operational Guide for Medium-Scale Enterprises, 3
(UN Global Compact 2007), online at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/8.1/OperationalgudeME.pdf (visited
Oct 25, 2010).
6 A recent Global Compact brochure describes the compact as "voluntary, yet accountable." United
Nations Global Compact: Corporate Ciiienshsp in the World Economy 3 *(UN Global Compact 2008)
online at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/8.1/GC brochureFINAL.pdf
(visited Oct 25, 2010).
7 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations ofNon-State Actors 195 (Oxford 2006).
8 See Justine Nolan and Luke Taylor, Corporate Responsibility for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Rights in Search of a Remed?, 87 J Bus Ethics 433 (2009).
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We face, then, problems of incoherence and arbitrariness. By incoherence, I
mean that the legal framework applicable to businesses lacks order and clarity.
By arbitrariness, I mean that the framework, such as it is, has developed largely
through the efforts of activist NGOs and businesses with varying degrees of
self-interest. Notably absent-or at least muted-are the voices of victims and
governments. As a result, we now have a third problem: normative overstretch. By
this I mean that rhetoric has outstripped reality, with assertions of a right to this
and a right to that, without any clear legal or political foundation.
Some of this normative confusion relates to the idiosyncrasies of
international law, where it is quite common to have obligations without formal
enforcement mechanisms. Unlike domestic law, which was historically thought
of as having a vertical relationship between sovereign and subject, international
law operates-at least theoretically-in a realm where states exist in a horizontal
plane of sovereign equality.' But in the case of business and human rights, the
danger is that we may be offering the illusion of regulation, which may be worse
than no regulation at all.10
The argument presented in this article is that the norms governing
businesses in conflict zones are both understudied and undervalued-
understudied because the focus is generally on human rights of universal
application, rather than the narrower regime of international humanitarian law
(IHL), and undervalued because IHL may provide a more certain foundation for
real norms that can be applied to businesses and the individuals who control
them.
The article proceeds in three parts. Section II briefly describes the
normative regime that is set up by human rights and IHL. Section III looks at
the specific situation of conflict zones and efforts to regulate some of the newer
entities on the scene, particularly private military and security compames.
Section IV then sketches out a regime that focuses not on toothless regulation,
but on a model of governance that combines limited sanctions with a wider
structuring of incentives. These three parts will be referred to in shorthand as
"lawyers," "guns," and "money."
II. LAWYERS
There is a proliferation of literature discussing human rights and business,
but very little that looks at the issue of businesses operating in conflict zones and
the applicability of IHL.
9 See generally Simon Chesterman, Ag Internaional Rule ofLaw?, 56 Am J Comp L 331 (2008).
10 But see Thomas Nagel, The Problem of GlobalJusice, 33 Phil & Pub Aff 113 (2005).
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This is understandable in terms of the prominence and dynamism of
human rights as a sub-discipline as contrasted with the conservatism of IHL. But
from a doctrinal perspective it is somewhat odd, as the direct applicability of
human rights norms to business is far less clear than the applicability of IHL.
A. Human Rights
To be sure, businesses are increasingly aware of human rights law." In part,
this is due to the general expansion in content and broader acceptance of human
rights norms in the past two decades. In Southeast Asia, for example, the early
1990s saw the "Asian values" debates that resisted arguments that human rights
are universal. Today, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
established an intergovernmental mechanism to discuss human rights.12 The UN
Human Rights Council created in 2006, for all its flaws, now has a process of
universal periodic review. China, long suspicious of human rights, went through
this process in February 2009.
The link between human rights and business is also due to the work of
activists and NGOs, often targeting specific practices or industries. This is not
limited to "crunchy granola" types, however. An increasing number of
institutional investors-notably including Norway's sovereign wealth fund-
have linked their investment strategies to human rights, the environment, and
other considerations. 3
There is now a community that includes activists, investors, and some of
the businesses themselves. Among other things, this has led to the adoption of
various principles and guidelines that offer non-binding standards for business.
In addition to the Global Compact,14 these include the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for
11 See generally Larry Cati Backer, Multinational Coiporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations'
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Sodal Responsibility in
International Law, 37 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 287 (2006); Ann Marie McLoughlin, Comment,
International Trend of Multinational Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Abuses and the Role of the
United States, 33 Ohio N U L Rev 153 (2007); Brandon Prosansky, Mining Gold in a Conlct Zone:
The Context, Ramfrcations, and Lessons ofAngloGold Ashanti's Activities in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 5 Nw J Intl Hum Rts 236 (2007); Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and Liability for
International Human Rights Abuses: Recent Changes and Recuning Challenges, 6 Nw J Intl Hum Rts 222
(2008); Debbie Johnston, Lifting the Veil on Corporate Terroism: The Use of the Criminal Code Terrism
Framework to Hold Multinational Corporations Accountable for Comply in Human Rights Violations
Abroad, 66 U Toronto Fac L Rev 137 (2008).
12 See Tan Hsien-Li, The ASEAN Human Rights Body: Incorporating Forgotten Promises for Poliy Coherence
and Efficay, 12 Singapore Y B Intl L 239 (2008).
13 See Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment from Multinational Corporations for Human
Rsghts Violations-The Case ofNorway's Sovereign Wealth Fund, 23 Am U Intl L Rev 577 (2008).
14 See UN Global Compact Operational Guide (cited in note 5).
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Multinational Enterprises,'" the International Labor Organization's (ILO)
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises," the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 7 the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI) Guidelines," the Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000)
standards," and so on.
The most ambitious initiative was the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
(Norms), drafted under the auspices of the UN Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Sub-Commission).20 Unlike the
various voluntary principles and codes of conduct that had come before, the
Norms claimed to set out human rights standards drawing on international
humanitarian law and civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, as well
as consumer protection and environmental practices. The intention was to have
them adopted by the UN in some form, which would have confirmed the
content of the obligations as well as implementation mechanisms to monitor and
report on compliance.
The drafting process took several years, but when the document moved
from the experts in the Sub-Commission to the government representatives of
the Commission on Human Rights, the reception was decidedly cool. 2' The
Commission passed a short resolution in 2004 stating that the Norms had "not
15 Originally adopted in 1976, the most recent revision of the guidelines was completed in 2000. See
OECD Guidenes for Multinational Enterprises (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2000), online at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines (visited Oct 29,
2010); Clapham, Human Rghts Obigations at 201-11 (cited in note 7). Consultation on a further
revision took place in December 2009.
16 Tnratite Dedaration of Prinples Concerning Mulinational Enterprises and Sodal Polig (International
Labour Organization 1977), online at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---edemp/--
empent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2010); Clapham,
Human lights Obhgations at 241 (cited in note 7).
17 Voluntary Prinales on Securi and Human Rghts (Voluntaryprinciples.org 2000), online at
http://voluntaryprinciples.org/files/voluntary-principles-english.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2010).
18 G3 Guideknes (Global Reporting Initiative 2006), online at
http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Guidelines (visited Oct 25, 2010).
19 Social Accountabikty 8000 (SA8000) (Social Accountability International 2008), online at
http://www.sa-intL.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf (visited Oct 25,
2010).
20 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibiiies of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
21 John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rghts: The Evolving Internadonal Agenda, 101 Am J Intl L
819, 820-21 (2007).
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been requested," that the document "has no legal standing," and that the Sub-
Commission "should not perform any monitoring function in this regard." 22
In place of the Commission's approach, a new Special Representative of
the Secretary-General (SRSG) was appointed with a mandate to "identify and
clarify" international standards and policies, research the implications of
concepts such as "complicity" and "sphere of influence," and submit views and
recommendations to what is now the Human Rights Council.2 3
The SRSG, Harvard's John Ruggie, embraced an important doctrinal move
that had long been a stumbling block in the application of human rights to
business: the sterile debate over who is and who is not a "subject" of
international law. Increasingly, he noted corporations are recognized as
"participants" at the international level, with the capacity to bear some rights and
some duties under international law.24
In terms of content, however, Ruggie was deeply critical of the Norms,
suggesting that they had become victims of their own "doctrinal excesses" and
had made "exaggerated legal claims." 25 He challenged in particular the view that
they could be both a path-breaking advance and yet also merely restate
international law applicable to businesses:
[T]aken literally, the two claims cannot both be correct. If the [Norms]
merely restate established international legal principles then they cannot also
directly bind business because, with the possible exception of certain war
crimes and crimes against humanity, there are no generally accepted
international legal principles that do so. And if the [Norms] were to bind
business directly then they could not merely be restating international egal
principles; they would need, somehow, to discover or invent new ones.
In essence, what the Norms did was merely to take existing human rights norms
applicable to states and assert that they also apply to corporations.2 7
22 UN Commission on Human Rights Res No 2004/116, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7
(2004). See also Giovanni Mantilla, Emerging International Human Rights Norms for Transnational
Corporations, 15 Global Governance 279, 286-87 (2009).
23 UN Commission on Human Rights Res No 2005/69 N 1, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/L.87 (2005).
24 John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and
Accountabity for Corporate Acts 20, UN Doe A/HRC/4/35 (2007). See, for example, Philip Allott,
Eunomia: New Order for a New World 372-73 (Oxford 1990); Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process:
International Law and How We Use It 49-50 (Oxford 1994).
25 John Gerard Ruggie, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 59, UN Doc
E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006).
26 Id T 60.
27 Philip Alston, The 'Not-a-Cat" Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
state Actors?, in Philip Alston, ed, Non-State Actors and Human Rights 32-33 (Oxford 2005). But see
David Weissbrodt, International Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibiktes of Business, 26
Berkeley J Intl L 373, 382 (2008).
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Ruggie's position, predictably, was not warmly embraced by the business-
human rights enthusiasts.28 But he was drawing an important line that is often
blurred in the area of human rights between ought and is. Not every human
wrong can be remedied by a human right. And there is a danger that playing fast
and loose with the language of human rights dilutes its value. To put it crudely,
there is universal acceptance that torture is a violation of human rights; there is
no such acceptance that growing coffee beans in the shade, say, is in the same
sense a human right. Asserting that "human rights" requires all manner of
constraints on business risks moving the entire discourse into the same vague
category of CSR.
In an attempt to impose some rigor on the discourse, Ruggie identified five
categories of norms, moving from those most deeply rooted in international law
to voluntary standards. The two categories with the most solid foundation were
state duties to protect against corporate abuses and corporate responsibility for
international crimes prosecuted in domestic courts. Other possible sources of
norms were corporate responsibility for certain human rights violations
extrapolated from general human rights norms, soft law mechanisms, and self-
regulation.29 It is possible that this ground is shifting-there is, for example, an
argument that, at least within the EU legal system, treaty law has created direct
international obligations for corporations"3 -but it is shifting slowly.
This need for doctrinal purity is not a purely academic conceit. Indeed,
maintaining the purity of doctrine is one of the basic purposes of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), sometimes described as the
high priesthood of international humanitarian law.
B. International Humanitarian Law
The overwhelming focus on the application of human rights norms to
business, rather than IHL, is somewhat ironic given that human rights, stricto
sensu, bind only states.31 States sign human rights treaties and promise to respect
28 See, for example, Weissbrodt, 26 Berkely J Intl L at 390 (cited in note 27) (stating that the SRSG
"was supposed to develop standards, but has instead attempted to derail the standard-setting
process and bow to the corporate refusal to accept any standards except voluntary codes"). But
see Nina Seppala, Business and the International Human Rights Regime: A Compatison of UN Initiadves,
87 J Bus Ethics 401, 409-10 (2009).
29 Ruggie, 101 Am J Intl L at 828-37 (cited in note 21).
30 See Clapham, Human Rights Obhgations at 241 (cited in note 4).
31 But see Business and International Humanitarian Law 13-14 (International Committee of the Red
Cross 2006), online at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_- 0882.pdf (visited
Nov 20, 2010) (stating that although this strict application is the traditional understanding of
human rights, some advocates have challenged that position).
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and ensure the various rights.32 IHL explicitly binds states and individuals. There
is a sound doctrinal basis for holding that business may have obligations under
international law, but the limited field in which this has practical effect is
primarily international crimes justiciable in national jurisdictions.
So why is so little attention paid to IHL? First, and most obviously, only a
relatively small number of businesses operate in conflict zones. Second, whereas
human rights activism and CSR have encouraged positive activities-with
businesses able to declare that they pay fair trade wages, promote girls'
education, and so on-one is unlikely to see the same developments with
respect to IHL compliance.
What, then, does IHL say about business in conflict zones? It offers some
protections and some limitations. A preliminary question is whether IHL
applies. This depends on whether the activity in question is closely linked to
armed conflict.
The protections afforded to business may include non-combatant status.
Even if an entity is providing food or shelter to a party to the conflict, it may not
lose that status. Whether specific facilities are targets will depend on whether
they make an effective contribution to military action.34 Easy cases include where
a business provides direct support to one side in a conflict.
In terms of limitations on business activities, obvious prohibitions would
include committing or knowingly assisting in grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. This would cover arms manufacturers who produce prohibited
weapons such as chemical or biological weapons-and perhaps cluster
munitions and landmines-or who knowingly supply weapons to end-users who
then violate IHL. Other obligations include the prohibition of pillage-the
unlawful taking of private property for personal use." Labor conditions are also
regulated, including the labor of civilians, prisoners-of-war (POWs), and
concentration camp detainees. States may compel certain categories of person to
work, but businesses themselves cannot do so. In any case, IHL prohibits
uncompensated or abusive labor. Other provisions cover forced
32 See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), Art 2(1),
999 UNTS 171.
33 See, for example, Clapham, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 906 (cited in note 4).
34 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol 1) (1977), Art 52,
1125 UNTS 3.
35 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949),
Art 33, 75 UN Treaty Ser 287 (1950).
36 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), Arts 49-55, 75
UN Treaty Ser 135 (1950); Geneva Convention (IV) at Arts 40, 51, 95 (cited in note 35); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
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displacement," damage to the environment (potentially including the sale of
defoliants)," and so on.
Problematic areas include ensuring the security of legitimate business
activities in a conflict zone. In some situations, a business may be required to
retain the services of the government or a particular armed group in order to
remain in business. Hiring groups that do not respect IHL while engaged in
armed conflict, for example by attacking civilians, may expose the business to
legal liability even if it did not intend the violations to occur and even if the
actions were not carried out on its behalf.39
But the most controversy and activity in this area have been with respect to
private military and security companies (PMSCs) not simply operating in conflict
zones but providing services directly connected to the conflict itself. PMSCs
have been responsible for some of the most egregious cases of violations of
IHL, such as the use of cluster munitions by Executive Outcomes (EO) in
African conflicts in the 1990s, the killing of protected persons by Blackwater in
Iraq, and unlawful interrogation practices used by CACI and Titan in the Abu
Ghraib detention facility.
PMSCs are of interest in part because it is routinely and incorrectly asserted
that they operate in a normative vacuum, but also because they reflect a
transformed relationship to the state, with increasing reliance on outsourcing to
businesses.
III. GUNS
A. The Fall and Rise of Mercenaries
Private military and security companies such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy,
ArmorGroup and their ilk are frequently compared to mercenaries. This is partly
accurate: they are private actors offering military services ranging from training
and advice to combat. It is misleading, however, in two very different ways. The
first is that no major firm today offers to fight wars for a fee. Although EO and
Sandline International did provide such services to Sierra Leone, Angola, and
Papua New Guinea in the 1990s, that aspect of the industry has come to be
discredited-epitomized in the move from private "military" to "security"
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II) (1977), Art 5(1)(e), 1125
UN Treaty Ser 609 (1978).
37 Convention (IV) at Art 49 (cited in note 35).
38 Hans-Peter Gasser, Guidelines for Mifitay Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in
Times ofArmed Conflict, 311 Intl Rev Red Cross 230 (1996).
39 Business and International Humanitarian Lan at 21 (cited in note 31).
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companies (EO and Sandline have since been shut down, although many key
individuals quickly resurfaced in new corporate guises). 40
It is also misleading in that it implies that the comparison is negative. This
glosses over much of the history of mercenaries. Although the adjective
"mercenary" today means to be motivated chiefly by the desire for gain, until
around two centuries ago mercenaries were very much the norm in European
armies. Indeed, the Pope is still guarded by a contingent of Swiss mercenaries
first retained in 1506. Less pejorative meanings live on in terms such as
"freelance," which now describes a writer operating on short-term contracts but
previously denoted someone with a lance and some spare time.4 1
The discrediting of skilled warriors offering their services at a price in favor
of national armies was partly a function of technology. Around the time of the
Napoleonic Wars, the introduction of the musket greatly reduced the time
required to train an effective soldier. Quantity soon became more important
than quality, and national conscription a more efficient way of generating an
army than outside hiring. These military and economic shifts were reinforced by
politics and culture. Around the nineteenth century, mercenaries "went out of
style."42 Notably, the Social Contract and the Enlightenment transformed the
individual's relationship to the state, which came to be based not on a feudal
allegiance but the idea of citizenship. 43 Reliance upon mercenaries was no longer
necessary and also came to be seen as suspect: a country whose men would not
fight for that country lacked patriots; those individuals who would fight for
reasons other than love of country lacked morals."
Mercenaries never really went out of business, however, and continued to
be important in low-technology wars where the quality of troops and their
weapons still mattered. This explains both their ongoing significance in Africa
through the twentieth century-frequently in attempting to overthrow weak
governments-and efforts by those governments through the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) and the UN to prohibit mercenarism completely.4 5
4 Section III.A draws on several passages previously published in Simon Chesterman, Leashing the
Dogs of War: The Rise and Regulation ofPrivate Militay Companies, 5 Carnegie Rep 36 (2008).
41 See generally P.W. Singer, Corporate Waniors: The Rise of the Privaized Militay Industy (Cornell
2003).
42 Deborah Avant, From Mercenag to CitiZen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War, 54 Intl Org
41, 41 (2000).
43 See generally Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatiing Security (Cambridge
2005); Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The Histor ofa Norm in International Relations (Oxford 2007).
4 See Avant, Marketfor Force (cited in note 43); Percy, Mercenaries (cited in note 43).
45 See, for example, Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (1977),
OAU Doc CM/433/Rev L Annex 1; International Convention against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing, and Training of Mercenaries (1989), 63 UNTS 75; Angela McIntyre and Taya Weiss,
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But it was the end of the Cold War that saw an explosion in mercenary
activity. The 1990s saw a proliferation of small-scale conflicts and a demand for
skilled military services matched by a sudden supply of trained soldiers. State
militaries by the end of that decade employed roughly seven million fewer
soldiers than they did in 1989. Some units that were retired, such as the South
African 32nd Recon Battalion and the Soviet Alpha unit, kept the outline of their
structure and simply reconstituted themselves as corporations.4
These trends explain the rise of Blackwater and its peers but not their
attractiveness to Washington. The US retains such companies for reasons very
different than those of Sierra Leone, Angola, and Papua New Guinea. In the
1991 Gulf War, it employed one contractor for every fifty active-duty personnel;
by the 1999 Kosovo conflict, contractors made up 10 percent of US personnel
and served as the US force's supply and engineering corps. After the US went
into Iraq in 2003, contractors made up the second largest group of personnel
after the US military-far more than the number of British troops at their
highpoint. Other accounts put contractor numbers in excess even of US
personnel.47
The growing reliance on contractors by the US military was driven in part
by the need to increase capacity swiftly (and flexibly) after the slow downsizing
of the post-Cold War decade. It must also be seen in the context of the larger
trend towards outsourcing in the US government. A 2003 Government
Accountability Office report examined these trends and concluded that
outsourcing by the military provided access to specialized technical skills,
enabled it to bypass limits on military personnel able to be deployed to certain
regions, and ensured scarce resources would be available for other assignments.
What it did not support is the normal justification for outsourcing: that it saves
money.48 Subsequent investigations produced mixed results. 49
Weak Governments in Search of Strength: Africa's Experience of Mercenaries and Private Military Companies,
in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, eds, From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of
Private Mitay Companies 67-84 (Oxford 2007).
46 See generally Singer, Corporate Warriors (cited in note 41).
47 See T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, LA Times Al (June 4, 2007) (stating
that, at the time of the article, there were 180,000 civilians "working in Iraq under US contracts"
as opposed to "160,000 soldiers and a few thousand government employees [who] are stationed
in Iraq").
4s Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans (US
Government Accountability Office 2003), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03695.pdf
(visited Oct 25, 2010).
49 See, for example, W/arflghter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus
Contractors for Security Services in Iraq (US Government Accountability Office 2010), online at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0266r.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2010) (concluding that contractors
were cheaper in four out of five cases examined).
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In fact, as the periodic scandals emerging from the contracts awarded to
security and reconstruction firms in Iraq have demonstrated, relying on private
companies can be very expensive. For a country lacking an effective military,
such as Sierra Leone in the 1990s facing Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United
Front, investing in a private army might make at least short-term sense. For the
US, however, it is apparent that the turn to contractors is driven by the
ideological conviction that the private sector is inherently more competent than
the public sector, and the political necessity of keeping troop numbers-and
casualty numbers-artificially low. The use of contractors enabled the US to
keep its troop numbers around twenty thousand below what would have been
required to field equivalent strength in Iraq. And although precise figures are
difficult to obtain, excluding contractor deaths from official US casualties has
kept those figures many hundreds lower than they might have been.so
B. Accountability
It is frequently asserted that private military companies such as Blackwater
operate in a legal vacuum.s" This is simply not true. In theory, at least, they are
subject to the laws of the land in which they are operating, in particular its
criminal law. In practice, however, these companies operate in places with weak
or dysfunctional legal systems. There are occasions where contractors have been
tried and convicted of crimes. In July 2008, for example, Simon Mann was
sentenced to thirty-four years in prison for his role in an attempted coup in
Equatorial Guinea.5 2 But, such trials are exceptional.
It will not be possible to offer a general survey of the various ways in
which PMSCs might be held accountable.53 For present purposes, I will highlight
three areas in which there have been some interesting developments.
50 See, for example, John M. Broder and James Risen, Contractor Deaths in Iraq Soar to Record, NY
Times (May 19, 2007), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/world/middleeast/19contractors.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq
=Death%20Toll%20for%20Contractors%20Reaches%20New%20High%20&st=cse (visited
Nov 20, 2010).
51 See, for example, James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater Are Collapsing, NY Times Al (Oct 21,
2010).
52 Mann was pardoned and released in November 2009. See Adam Nossiter and Alan Cowell,
Guinea Frees British Mercenay, NY Times A6 (Nov 4, 2009).
53 See generally Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, eds, From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and
Regulation of Private Militay Companies (Oxford 2007); Jenny S. Lam, Accountability for Private MiltaU
Contractors Under the Alien Tort Statute, 97 Cal L Rev 1459 (2009); Adam Ebrahim, Note, Going to
War with the Army You Can Afford: The United States, International Law, and The Private Militay Industr,
28 BU Intl L J 181 (2010); Amol Mehra, Bridging Accountability Gaps: The Prokferation of Private
Mihtary and Security Companies and Ensuring Accountabilty for Human Rights Violations, 22 Pac
McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 323 (2010).
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The first is in the reaffirmation of "hard" law as it applies to PMSCs. The
ICRC-the "high priests" of IHL, as I called them earlier-working with the
Swiss government, convened a process that in September 2008 adopted the
Montreux Document on PMSCs. Unlike the UN and OAU conventions, the
seventeen states that signed onto the Montreux Document include prominent
home and contracting states such as the US, Britain, and South Africa, as well as
territorial or host countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
The purpose of the document was to clarify the normative environment
within which PMSCs operate. Among other things, it constitutes a formal
rejection of the widespread perception that such bodies operate in a legal
vacuum. It carefully maps out the various obligations owed by different
parties-contracting states, territorial states, home states, as well as the PMSCs
themselves and their personnel. At the same time, however, it is charmingly
vague in the content of those obligations. For PMSCs and their personnel, for
example, it merely states that they are "obliged, regardless of their status, to
comply with applicable international humanitarian law." 5 4 It is not nothing-but
not much, either. It is, maybe, an advance beyond the efforts to criminalize
mercenarism that required proof that a person was "motivated to take part in
the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain."" The difficulty of
proving such motivation led one writer to suggest that anyone convicted of the
offense should be shot-as should his lawyer."
The second area of movement has been in the drafting of codes of conduct
and other non-binding approaches to regulation. Following from the Montreux
process, a code of conduct was drafted with extensive consultation and was
signed in November 2010." The code refers to the obligation of companies to
respect relevant obligations and principles of IHL and human rights law; in
particular that they will not "participate in, encourage, or seek to benefit from
any national or international crimes including but not limited to war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, enforced disappearance, forced or
S The Montreux Document on Pertinent Internatonal Legal Obhgations and Good Practices for States Related to
Operations of Private Militay and Security Companies During Armed Conft Part I, 26(a) (Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs & International Committee of the Red Cross 2008), online at
http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc (visited Oct 29, 2010). See generally James Cockayne, Regulatng
Private Militay and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiaion, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux
Document, 13 J Conflict & Security L 401 (2008).
ss International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries
Art 1(1)(b), General Assembly Res No 44/34, UN Doc No A/Res/44/34 (1989).
56 Geoffrey Best, quoted in David Shearer, Private Armies and Mita Intervention 18 (Oxford 1998).
57 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies and Private Militag Companies (Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs 2010), online at http://www.dcaf.ch/privatisation-security (visited
Oct 25, 2010) (draft for consulation as of Oct 8, 2010).
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compulsory labor, hostage-taking, sexual or gender-based violence, human
trafficking, the trafficking of weapons or drugs, child labor or extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions.""
This follows a variety of other attempts to develop codes of conduct. I was
involved in one of the less successful initiatives that produced the "Greentree
Notes" in 2007." Industry associations, notably the International Peace
Operations Association (IPOA), have had more purchase. The IPOA Code of
Conduct, now in its twelfth iteration, includes expansive acknowledgement of
the applicability of IHL and human rights.60 The member companies include
well-known bodies such as ArmorGroup, DynCorp International, and Triple
Canopy.
Yet the limitations of voluntary codes of conduct were displayed when
IPOA authorized the first investigation of one of its members for alleged
excessive use of force. This took place a few weeks after the Nisour Square
incident of September 2007 in which Blackwater personnel killed seventeen Iraqi
civilians. IPOA opened an investigation into whether Blackwater was in
compliance with the code. Two days after the investigation was announced,
Blackwater withdrew from the association entirely and announced that it was
setting up its own association, the Global Peace and Security Operations
Institute. The boilerplate website included a few platitudes, but made it clear that
Blackwater is the only member of this institute and that it does not have a code
of conduct." IPOA's code remains essentially untested.
The third area of movement is in the gradual, belated recognition that the
relentless drive to privatize every aspect of government might have its limits. In
the wake of the Nisour Square incident, the FBI opened an investigation and
half a dozen investigators prepared to fly to Baghdad to examine the crime scene
and interview witnesses. Under its State Department contract, initial plans
provided for the investigators' security and transportation outside the Green
Zone to be provided by none other than Blackwater itself. Following protests,
5s id 1 22.
s9 Greentree Notes: Regulating the Prvate Commercial Militag Sector (Cbair's Summay) (Institute for
International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law 2007), online at
http://www.iilj.org/research/GreentreeNotes.asp (visited Oct 25, 2010).
60 Code of Conduct 12 (International Peace Operations Association 2009), online at
http://ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconduct/87-codecodeofconductvl2enghtml.htm (visited Oct
25, 2010).
61 The Institute now appears to be defunct. The rebranding of Blackwater as Xe Services is
discussed in Section IV.C.
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the FBI announced that in order to avoid "even the appearance" of a conflict of
interest, its agents would be protected by US government personnel.62
After revelations of these and other abuses-the CACI and Titan
interrogations in Abu Ghraib, official testimony that CIA contractors
participated in the waterboarding, and a contract that paid Blackwater to plan
the assassination of senior al Qaeda leaders-there has been some discussion as
to whether the US has been illegally outsourcing "inherently governmental"
functions. But a definition of what that covers is maddeningly hard to find.
This is partly because the US attitude toward privatization is radically
different from the European understanding. In Europe, there is a debate over
whether public functions should be transferred to private actors. In the US, the
question is framed as whether certain functions should be public in the first
place. In the US then, the "inherently governmental" label operates not as a
protected area of public interest so much as an increasingly narrow exception to
the presumption that all aspects of government should be considered for
privatization. This has undermined accountability and justified some terrible
policies.63
There are two basic reasons why certain functions should never be
outsourced. First is if it would make effective accountability impossible-as in
the case where a program operates in secret and has the potential for abusive
conduct. Second is where the public interest requires oversight by a
governmental (and therefore politically accountable) actor.
The first is really a legal argument for the possibility of accountability.
Allowing the delegation of covert action to private actors undermines even the
limited checks on defense operations. That may, of course, be the point: it is
clear that no one intended the CIA's assassination program to be made public
until Leon Panetta, President Obama's director of the CIA, was briefed on it
four months into his tenure. He sensibly terminated the program, briefed
Congress, and successfully blamed the whole thing on his predecessors.64
The second argument is a political one. It accepts that even in a democracy
it is sometimes necessary to push at the limits of law to deal with threats. But
such actions can only be justified if they are linked to the democratic structures
62 Securio for FBI Personnel Investigating Blackwater (Federal Bureau of Investigation Press Release
2007), online at http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/security-for-fbi-personnel-
investigating-blackwater (visited Oct 25, 2010).
63 See Simon Chesterman, 'We Can't Spy... If We Can't Buy!": The Pivaiiation of U.S. Intellgence Senices
and the Limits of Outsouring '7nherently Governmental" Funcions, 19 Eur J Intl L 1055, 1069-73 (2008).
64 See Mark Mazzetti, Outsiders Hired as CLA Planned to Kill jihadists, NY Times (Aug 20, 2009); Joby
Warrick and R. Jeffrey Smith, CIA Hired Firm forAssassin Program: Blackwater Missions Against Al-
.Queda Never Began, Wash Post (Aug 20, 2009).
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they are intended to protect. A workable definition of "inherently
governmental" would cover the exercise of discretion in actions that significantly
affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons. Such a definition would
prohibit the Blackwater assassination program and severely restrict the role of
contractors in interrogations. It may be the reason why a recent spate of Alien
Tort Claims Act cases has progressed further than normal, notably including a
suit against Blackwater's corporate reincarnation, Xe Services, that was settled in
January 2010." (A counter-trend may be seen in a Second Circuit Court of
65 The Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA," also referred to as the Alien Tort Statute) is an idiosyncratic
piece of legislation. Its drafting history is obscure, its scope highly contentious, and for nearly two
centuries it all but lay dormant on the US statute books. In its entirety, it provides that "[tihe
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 USC § 1350. Its
resurrection in 1980 earned it the label the "Rip Van Winkle of statutes." Karen Lin, An
Unintended Double Standard of Liabily: The Effect of the Wesfall Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108
Colum L Rev 1718, 1732 (2008). For the most part, it was used in actions that were largely one-
sided against uniquely unpopular defendants. Many such cases were essentially symbolic, with
little hope for any recovery of damages.
In a footnote in its Sosa decision, the US Supreme Court raised the question of "whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual." Sosa v AlvaZ-
Machain, 542 US 692, 732 n 20 (2004). The footnote cited, as an indication of different possible
answers, a 1984 DC Circuit Court decision which said that, at that time, there was insufficient
consensus that torture by private actors violates international law. Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Repub,
726 F2d 774, 791-95 (DC Cir 1984). A decade later, the Second Circuit held that there was a
consensus that genocide by private actors did violate international law. Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F3d
232, 239-41 (2d Cir 1995).
It is arguable that the two cases are not so inconsistent, as torture by definition requires a
connection with public authority. A more recent DC Circuit decision concluded that "[elven if
torture suits cannot be brought against private parties-at least not yet-it may be that 'war
crimes' have a broader reach." Saleb v Titan Corp, 580 F3d 1, 15 n 13 (2009).
Various cases have held that there is no reason to distinguish between natural and juridical
persons in such actions. See, for example, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Takisman Enery, Inc, 244 F
Supp 2d 289, 319 (SDNY 2003) ("[a] private corporation is a juridical person and has no per se
immunity under US domestic or international law"); Kbulumani v Barclay NatI Bank Ld, 504 F3d
254, 282 (2d Cir 2007) ("[The issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the ATCA
[is] indistinguishable from the question of whether private individuals may be."). As one court
observed: "Limiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the corporation directing the
individual's action through its complex operations and changing personnel makes little sense in
today's world." In reAgent Orange Prod Liab Litig, 373 F Supp 2d 7, 58 (EDNY 2005).
An October 2009 decision in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia summarized
the position as follows:
Congress, by ratifying the Geneva Conventions and by enacting the War
Crimes Act, has defined the international law norm governing war crimes. This
norm is binding, universal, and precisely defined. Accordingly, the ATS
recognizes a cause of action alleging war crimes, and claims arising under this
cause of action are cognizable against non-state actor defendants, including
corporations. This cause of action requires plaintiffs to show that defendants
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Appeals decision in September 2010, holding that the Alien Torts Claims Act
allows jurisdiction only over crimes committed by natural rather than juridical
persons-a point certain to be challenged on appeal. 6)
Unfortunately, debates about US reliance on contractors tend to
focus on questions of cost and periodic outrage at corruption. A consensus
appeared to emerge that contractors should not be in charge of "enhanced"
interrogation, but this seemed driven by the fact that each of the alleged
torturers cost the US taxpayer about double the salary of a Federal employee.
Even the assassination program failed to start a meaningful debate on what
should and what should not be outsourced. At the very least, the responsibility
to determine what is and is not "inherently governmental" should itself be an
inherently governmental task.
IV. MONEY
The last topic I touch on is the underlying theoretical question of what is
meant when words like "regulation", "accountability", or "governance" are used
with respect to businesses operating in conflict zones. As I highlighted above,
loose talk of responsibility begs the questions of responsibility to whom and for
what. I would submit that "voluntary accountability" is an oxymoron. That does
not mean we should give up on corporate accountability. But it does suggest that
we should be a little more careful.
I return to the three problems I identified at the beginning-that the
business and human rights discourse is plagued by incoherence, arbitrariness, and
overstretch--and offer some concrete suggestions as to how these problems might
be addressed.
A. Coherence
To deal with the problem of incoherence, one requires clarity. Clarity, for
example, about what is an international crime, what is a human right, and what
would be ideal in a perfect world. These are, in many ways, strategic questions.
(i) intentionally (ii) killed or inflicted serious bodily harm (iii) upon innocent
civilians (iv) during an armed conflict and (v) in the context of and in
association with that armed conflict.
In re XE Services Aen Tort Liig 665 F Supp 2d 569, 588 (ED Va 2009). This case involved five
lawsuits brought by Iraqis against Xe Services and other corporate reincarnations of Blackwater,
as well as the owner of these entities, Erik Prince. Due to problems with the manner in which
facts had been pleaded, the plaintiffs were required to re-file in four of the cases. The case was
settled in January 2010.
66 Faobelv Roya/Dutch Petroleum, No 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d Cir 2010).
67 See Chesterman, 19 Eur J Intl L at 1073 (cited in note 63); Simon Chesterman and Angelina
Fisher, eds, Private Securi, Public Order The Outsouring ofPublic Senices and Its Limits (Oxford 2009).
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The danger of clarity is that it might create a race to the bottom in terms of
formal regulation. But clarity can also apply to what is intended to be achieved
through the market rather than through the law.
Clarity can also be useful in sharpening policy choices, in forcing decision-
makers to articulate why particular norms are being asserted and to what end.
This leads to addressing the second problem: arbitrariness.
B. Rationality
Dealing with the problem of arbitrariness suggests the need for a rational
allocation of resources. It may still make sense to focus on bourgeois consumer
tastes, because that is where there may be leverage. Pressing for fair trade caf6
lattes and rainforest alliance certified timber offers the possibility of relatively
"quick wins." But real change requires looking upstream at the supply chains of
major manufacturers and retailers, such as Wal-Mart, and at the extraction of
natural resources. This can pose some awkward decisions for the voluntary
regimes-as we have seen, for example, in the efforts to keep the Global
Compact at arm's length from tobacco companies.
A slightly different question is whether it is worth going after corporations
at all. Should we instead be addressing our attention to the individuals that
control them? This raises the problem of the anthropomorphism-the
attribution of human characteristics to non-human entities-of corporations. It
is common, for example, to see references to what corporations "may feel . . . is
in their interests[.]"" The difficulties of going after corporations include
evidentiary and practical problems. In terms of evidence, it may be hard to
establish the mental state of a corporate entity sufficient to establish guilt. In
practical terms, a corporation may be harder to discipline than an individual-
the only costs to be imposed are financial, and if these are excessive, then the
enterprise may be shut down. An eighteenth century Lord Chancellor of
England summed it up nicely when he observed that corporations "have neither
bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned; they therefore do as they
like."69
More fundamentally, however, we need to be sure that we are not allowing
the corporate veil to serve as a shield for the individuals who actually perpetrate
the wrong.
68 Clapham, Human Rights Obkgations at 231 (cited in note 7).
69 See John Poynder, 1 Literay Extracts from Englsh and Other Works; Collected During a Ha#fCentuy:
Together With Some Original Matter 268 (John Hatchard & Son 1844), quoting Lord Chancellor
Thurlow (1731-1806).
70 Simon Chesterman, The Corporate Veil, Crime and Punishment, 19 Melb U L Rev 1064, 1073-4
(1994).
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C. Modesty
The last problem is normative overstretch, and I suggest that one approach
to dealing with this is modesty. Modesty about what we can achieve through the
law, but also modesty about what we can achieve through the markets.
Markets can be an effective form of regulation, but operate best where
there is competition, an expectation of repeat encounters, and a free flow of
information. It is far from clear that any of these conditions exist for businesses
in conflict zones, especially for those whose business is conflict. Demand often
outstrips supply, as we saw in the scramble to fulfill multi-million dollar
contracts in Iraq; this creates monopoly-like problems and reduces the potential
leverage of the hiring agency to impose strong oversight provisions. Even where
such leverage exists, it may not be exercised because the hirer regards the
contract as an exceptional event in the life of the nation and that it will not
establish a precedent for future conduct. And where there might be leverage and
established relationships-as in the many contracts issued by the US
Departments of State and Defense-there has been minimal public scrutiny or
active efforts to avoid it.
It is possible to shape that market, however. Scandal can be a useful
discipline and has encouraged the adoption of codes of conduct by bodies such
as IPOA. This is, of course, self-serving: the creation of a "legitimate" business
through professionalization and the creation of industry associations may
distinguish reputable companies from cowboys, raising the cost of entry for
competitors and enabling the charging of higher fees for similar services. But it
may also point to the most promising way of dealing with an area in which
governments have failed. Modest examples of this are the disbanding of
Sandline and EO and the more recent repositioning of Blackwater as Xe
Services.
None of this is a substitute for regulation intended to deter and punish
abuse. Indeed, one might argue that poor regulation is worse than nothing, as it
gives the illusion of accountability while taking away the impetus for reform. Yet
focusing only on after-the-fact accountability, particularly in an environment
where investigations will always be difficult and prosecutions unlikely, overlooks
the role that regulation can play not just by punishing companies for behaving
badly but also by encouraging them to behave well.
V. CONCLUSION
In his defense of the approach he has taken as SRSG, John Ruggie argued
in the American Journal oflnternationalLaw that the most important area of work at
present lies in consolidating norms that exist and clarifying norms that are
required. At the same time, he argues that the focus needs to move away from
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seeking individual corporate liability for wrongdoing. Citing Amartya Sen's work
on rights, he argued that just as the human rights community has long urged a
move "beyond voluntarism" in the area of business and human rights, this must
be accompanied by a willingness to look "beyond compliance."" In his later
reports this has become formalized as the distinction between the obligation of
states to protect human rights, and that of businesses to respect them. 7 2
I fear that this may be giving too much of the game away. From my brief
survey of lawyers, guns, and money, I think that he is correct in imposing some
rigor on the business-human rights discourse. But a coherent, rational, modest
approach must strike a balance between commercial and public interests as well
as between voluntary and imposed regulation. It must draw upon international
law to establish baseline norms and domestic institutions to oversee the activities
of companies and punish individuals for abuse. It should also use the market to
shape incentives that encourage good and discourage bad behavior. In the
absence of such a regime, the marketplace of war will continue to be regulated-
if it is regulated at all-by bankruptcy and death.
71 Ruggie, 101 Am J Intl L at 839-40 (cited in note 21).
72 John Gerard Ruggie, Protect, Respect, and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights 17-
25, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 (2008). The 2009 report notes that this distinction may be problematic
when corporations exercise public functions. See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights:
Towards Operaionafi~ng the "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework 64, UN Doc A/HRC/11/13
(2009).
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